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an advanced economy. The automotive in-
dustry partly pushed forward the process. 
The mounting desire for motor vehicles is 
deemed as a vital driving force for boost-
ing domestic demand and energizing eco-
nomic growth. The contribution of the auto 
sector to GDP in China is reported to have 
risen from 0.97% (1999) to 2.29% (2009). 
Furthermore, global automobile focus has 
shifted eastwards to China. The Interna-
tional Organization of Motor Vehicle Manu-
facturers (or Organisation Internationale 
des Constructeurs d’Automobiles/OICA) 
reported that U.S. auto sales experienced 
a precipitous tumble to 13.49 million vehi-
cles or an 18% decline in 2008, the worst 
performance since 1992, strongly affected 
by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
Chinese auto sales rocketed in 2009 by 
46% and China overtook the U.S. as the 
major car consumer worldwide (notwith-
standing this was at a time when global 
auto sales were at a depressed level). 
Nevertheless, current levels of private 
motorized transport worldwide are unsus-
tainable. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) in 2010 recognised that the produc-
tion of conventional crude oil had peaked 
in 2006 and that from here on only expen-
sive and vulnerable oil sources remained 
(World Energy Outlook 2010). About 14% 
of all oil is consumed by road transpor-
tation (World Development Indicators 
2012). The 2011 CO2 emissions by trans-
port around the world accounted for 22% 
of the total. Road transportation, as the 
fastest-growing sector, contributed 52% of 
that in 1990, but some 75% in 2011 (CO2 
Emissions From Fuel Combustion High-
lights 2013). The other pertinent costs 
from road transportation include noise 
pollution, infrastructure costs, congestion 
costs, and costs from community sever-
ance and destruction of the public realm 
of cities (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999). 
Transport in general, and urban transport 
in particular, is broadly recognized as the 
major contributor to energy vulnerability, 
climate change and these issues grow dai-
ly in significance on the world stage.
China, whose proportion of global energy 
consumption has risen to 18.5% in 2009 
(Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2013), 
has overhauled the U.S.A as the largest 
energy consumer (Kennedy, 2011). The 
dramatic growth of motor vehicles is one 
of the most rapidly rising drivers of Chi-
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1. Introduction and Context of Chi-
nese Motorisation
Development patterns at national and 
international levels not only depend on 
relations between society and economy 
within and across regions, but also on the 
ecosystem capacity of other regions (Fol-
ke et al., 1998). As a result, the major-
ity of developed cities around the world 
have gained useful social, economic and 
especially, environmental returns from 
their recent mitigation of vehicle overuse 
(Puentes and Tomer, 2009; Newman and 
Kenworthy, 2011). However, cities in most 
emerging economies are undergoing rapid 
motorization such that it is imperative to 
explore the current status and negative 
impacts of this growing motorization in 
these countries.  China is particularly im-
portant in this regard since it is now widely 
acknowledged as the world’s largest car 
market and is the focus of most major car 
manufacturers, selling products from ba-
sic cars up to luxury models. In 2010 Chi-
na overtook Japan as the second largest 
economy behind the United States. Cities 
in developed countries have stepped into 
an era of declining car use, which some 
are terming “peak car use” (Newman and 
Kenworthy, 2011). The Chinese cities, on 
the contrary, are in a stage of flourishing 
development with a prosperous automo-
bile industry supporting it. Undoubtedly, 
social and economic benefits from increas-
ing motorization cannot be ignored. None-
theless, this comes at the cost of scarce 
natural resources, serious environmental 
impacts and large cultural changes ex-
pressed partly in the way that urban public 
spaces are being turned over to roads and 
parking and the old walking fabrics previ-
ously reliant on pedestrian and bike traf-
fic are often transformed into congested, 
noisy and polluted places (Mao and Chen, 
2009). 
Based on Petty-Clark’s Law and Kuznets 
Theory1, China has experienced an up-
grade of its industrial structure along with 
1 They refer to the transformation of industrial 
structure from labor-intensive to capital-intensive 
and finally to technology-intensive with the process 
of economic development.
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na’s increasing oil demand, accounting 
for roughly 32% in the national context in 
2002 (He et al., 2005). In regard to glo-
bally serious environmental deterioration, 
China achieved a worrying status in 2006. 
Its fossil fuel CO2 emissions were 24% 
worse than the United States level and 
China became the world’s largest emitter 
of CO2 (Yan and Crookes, 2009), stoking 
the increasingly severe global warming 
problem (Photo 1). The road transport-re-
lated CO2 emissions in China were 280.47 
Mt, accounting for 57.5% of the trans-
port-related CO2 emissions and 4.6% of 
the total CO2 emissions in China (Reduc-
ing Transport Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trends and Data 2010).
This paper begins with an overview of the 
Chinese auto-industry from its trial estab-
lishment, tortuous development, tremen-
dous prosperity to sound planning. It then 
retrospectively discusses the driving fac-
tors that resulted in the prosperous devel-
opment and unparalleled influence of the 
Chinese automobile industry. It examines 
economic growth, rising disposable in-
come, high savings rates, population ex-
plosion, urban sprawl, shifting land use 
practices and traditional culture, with a fo-
cus on the formulated and applied indus-
try policies from the Chinese government. 
With industrial polices shifting towards 
managing transportation demand and im-
proving urban public transport (UPT), it 
also discusses several on-going incentives 
including New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) and 
rail transport. In light of the expanding 
clout of this industrial giant worldwide, 
appropriate development of the Chinese 
automobile industry will be an important 
focus for sustainable development that 
can stimulate economic growth as well as 
social and environmental well-being both 
nationally and internationally.  
2. History of the Automobile Industry 
in China
The “Preparatory Group of the Auto-In-
dustry” under the Ministry of Heavy In-
dustry was set up in 1950 shortly after the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was es-
tablished in 1949 (Liu, 2000). The Chinese 
automobile industry, which was originally 
designated to meet military and transpor-
tation need, was more oriented to freight 
vehicles. The Automotive Industrial Policy 
(AIP) enacted in 1994 and the Tenth Five-
Year Plan (FYP) (2001-2005) successive-
ly encouraged individuals and families to 
purchase passenger vehicles. Passenger 
vehicles, which reflect higher technolo-
gies and more profitability, have therefore 
gradually been developed. Faced with in-
tegration into the global automobile com-
munity through entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese 
auto industry strategically shifted its de-
velopment focus from expanding its pro-
duction scale to enhancing its industrial 
structure. After these early developments, 
which helped pave the way for the Chinese 
automobile industry, the next step was the 
“Plan on Automobile Industry Restructur-
ing and Revitalization” (2009). This report 
stated that the auto-industry would play 
a crucial role in Chinese economic growth 
and social development. 
The automobile industry in China, which 
has now marched into its 5th decade, 
went from a situation where not a single 
vehicle had been produced before 1956, 
to one where in the space of just over 50 
years, it has grown to be the largest auto 
producer and consumer on a global scale 
since 2009 (Ferrazzi and Goldstein, 2011). 
What makes the achievement even more 
extraordinary is that for much of this 50-
year period China was a centrally planned, 
communist economy, not functioning with 
the capitalist principles that gave birth to 
the world’s other major auto manufac-
turing countries, such as Japan, the USA 
and Germany. It is therefore important to 
understand some of the detailed history 
behind this astonishing achievement. The 
following sections divide the development 
Photo 1: China’s rapid increase in private 
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From then on, at least until China’s 1978 
“Reform and Opening-up Policy,” the coun-
try groped forward with a dramatically 
fluctuating growth trend in its vehicle 
production rate (see Figure 1). Even af-
ter 1978, growth rates were very variable, 
but not of the same order as the “roller 
coaster” levels that characterised the pe-
riod between 1958 and 1978. The 1955, 
1956 and 1957 data are also available but 
are even more intensely volatile as would 
be expected with the small numbers being 
compared. For example, the auto produc-
tion of 1955 (61 Units) is 2611 times less 
than the 1956 level (1,654 units). Hence, 
these three earliest years are omitted from 
the time-series dataset. 
In the time of the Cold War when China 
was antagonistic towards the U.S., the full 
acceptance of Soviet-style technology un-
doubtedly sped up the process of indus-
trialization. But it also caused the Chinese 
auto-industry to become isolated from real 
economic conditions, and it built up institu-
tional obstacles to self-developed products 
(Holweg, et al., 2009). Thus, the kind of 
administrative management and economic 
frameworks in which Chinese vehicle pro-
duction operated thwarted innovation. 
Vehicle production in China was run by 
the government rather than through the 
market economy and it mainly served to 
develop the mechanized means of freight 
transport to satisfy economic construction. 
The central government held a monopoly 
on automobile supply in China. Vehicles 
of the Chinese auto industry into four dis-
tinct phases:
• Start-up Phase from 1956 to 1978; 
• Growing Phase from 1979 to 2000; 
• Prosperity Phase from 2001 to 2010; 
and 
• Stationary Phase from 2011 until the 
present day.
2.1 Start-up Phase (1956-1978)
In an attempt to transform China from an 
agricultural country to an industrial power, 
(the so called “New China”), the “Common 
Program of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference” (1949) stipu-
lated that nationally concentrated efforts 
should focus preferentially on revitaliza-
tion and development of heavy industry. 
The automobile industry was accordingly 
included in China’s first Five-Year Plan 
(1953-1957) under Mao Tse-tung and 
throughout all China’s national planning 
since then, right up until the latest Five-
Year Plan (2011-2015), China’s twelfth 
such plan since the communist revolution. 
The First Automobile Works (FAW), which 
was established in 1953, within the frame-
work of a technology collaboration pro-
gram between China and the former So-
viet Union, was geared towards heavy 
vehicles production for defence demand 
(Gan, 2003). The Chinese auto-industry 
formally broke ground in 1956 when the 
first group of heavy-duty trucks rolled off 
the production line (Zhou and Nie, 2007). 
Figure 1: 1958-2012 Auto Production (10,000 Units) and Growth Rate (%) in China 
Source: Compiled based on China Automotive Industry Yearbook and National Data (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics of China)
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manufactured from the FAW accumulated 
up to 150,000 units until 1965, represent-
ing 88.2 per cent of the national total (Hu, 
2002). Auto-enterprises were deficient 
in intrinsic motivation under the manda-
tory plan in strict compliance with China’s 
Planned Economy and therefore lacked the 
necessary innovation processes for a pro-
gressive, modernising auto industry.
In spite of this general situation, some na-
tional strategies emerged that, although 
being recognized as going against the 
‘law’ of Chinese development, neverthe-
less somewhat helped to facilitate the 
Chinese automotive industry. Mao’s Great 
Leap Forward (1958-1960) is an exam-
ple. It aimed to emulate and surpass the 
United Kingdom in the field of major in-
dustrial products output within 15 years. 
Consequently, more than one hundred mi-
nor local automotive factories were quickly 
formed and the entire vehicle production in 
1958 almost doubled the 1957 level (Chi-
na Automotive Industry Yearbook 2002). 
The resulting proliferation promoted four 
more automobile production sites built in 
the cities of Nanjing, Shanghai, Beijing 
and Jinan. Similarly, the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966-1976) caused nationwide up-
heaval but improved the localization of the 
automotive industry with the decentrali-
zation of central government power. The 
Second Auto Works (SAW), established in 
1969, has been recognised as becoming 
basically technologically independent in 
auto-manufacturing (Sit and Liu, 2000). 
Its location and products also reflected 
Chinese conditions. Since the Sino-Soviet 
split in 1960, China felt threatened by both 
the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. The 
SAW was therefore placed in a mountain-
ous region and mainly supplied military 
crossover vehicles and trucks designed to 
help prepare China against a possible for-
eign attack (Harwit, 1995).
The Chinese auto-industry, which started 
out with imported international technolo-
gy and national financial support, featured 
weak autonomy and rigid administration 
practices under a centrally planned econ-
omy. Under no circumstances can private 
auto-enterprises enter into the automobile 
market, or existing ones retreat from the 
auto market, when a national government 
erects such strong industrial barriers. 
Such practices generate inefficiencies and 
uncompetitive production systems. The 
cumulative output of automobiles in Chi-
na in the 22 years from 1955 until 1977 
was 1,252,527, about equivalent to the 
monthly production in 2009 (China Auto-
motive Industry Yearbook 2010).
2.2 Growing Phase (1979-2000)
The 1978 institutional reform from a 
state-controlled economy to a market-
oriented one had a remarkable influence 
on everyday aspects of social, economic 
and cultural life (Qian, 2000). As far as 
the automobile sector was concerned, the 
commercialisation of motor vehicles was 
not initiated until 1983 when the govern-
ment relinquished a 10 per cent share 
of self-marketing to auto-manufacturers 
themselves (Zhang, 2004). As explained 
earlier, the automotive industry in China 
in its formative years was regarded as a 
producer of freight vehicles and this gen-
erated a shortage of light vehicles. With 
respect to the passenger car that was trial-
produced by the FAW in 1958, it remained 
in a state of slow development until 1978. 
In that year its production reached a low 
of 2,640 units, accounting for just 1.7 per 
cent of China’s entire automotive products. 
It was at this time actually the “Chinese 
Truck Industry” rather than the “Chinese 
Automobile Industry”.
A large transformation occurred in China 
in 1984 when the purchase of private ve-
hicles was explicitly acknowledged as le-
gal at the national policy level (Provisions 
on Individual or Corporate Farmers Pur-
chase Motor Vehicles, Vessels and Trac-
tors for Transportation Business). The Chi-
nese government then adopted an even 
more positive stance towards ownership 
of private vehicles in the AIP (1994) and 
entrenched the concept of “Encourag-
ing Passenger Cars into Family” into the 
Tenth Five-Year Plan in 2001. The demand 
for automobiles in China, which had been 
dominated by government cars, subse-
quently transformed to private ownership 
of vehicles, which was even forbidden be-
fore 1979 (Liu, 2008). 
Consequently, the surging imbalance be-
tween a rapidly inflated demand for au-
tomobiles and limited domestic production 
triggered an import binge (see Figure 2). 
Imported-automobiles poured into China, 
both legally and illegally. The amount of 
imported automobiles from 1978 to 2012 
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mobile production up to 15% per annum 
from 1992 to 2002, which was ten times 
more than the global level (CAAM, 2002). 
The proportion of light-, mid-sized- and 
heavy-vehicles was adjusted to 78.5%, 
17.8% and 3.7%, respectively in 1998. 
The amount of imported cars accordingly 
reduced throughout the 1990s and bot-
tomed out in 1998 (18,016 Units), where-
as the ownership of private vehicles rose 
from 284,900 Units in 1985 to 4,236,500 
Units in 1998, an almost 14 times increase 
in just 13 years (see Figure 3).
2.3 Prosperity Phase (2001-2010)
Following from the previous period, Chi-
na came under the gaze of the WTO and 
China itself also recognized the value of 
being admitted to the WTO. As a result an 
agreement was struck between China and 
the WTO, that the import tariff on an as-
sembled car would in 2001 be reduced to 
80 per cent where the size of the engine 
occupied up to 93 per cent of China’s gross 
imports of all types of vehicles. The share 
of foreign imports of automobiles to the 
domestic market hit a peak of 44.5% in 
1985 (Ministry of Commerce/MOC, 2009).
For the purpose of mitigating the exacer-
bated drain on China’s foreign exchange, 
the central government resolved to tighten 
macro-regulatory conditions and cultivate 
its own national car-industry instead. More 
specifically, starting in 1985, high tariffs 
were levied on car-imports in order to pro-
tect the infant Chinese car industry. Such 
tariffs reached up to 220 per cent in 1992 
according to Notice on Cancelling Import 
Adjustment Tax (China Customs General 
Administration/CCGA, 1992). On the other 
hand, Sino-foreign joint ventures under the 
“Market for Technology Strategy” that was 
approved in 1984, promoted the integra-
tion of the Chinese auto-industry into the 
world. Promulgation of incentives boosted 
the average growth rate of Chinese auto-
Figure 2: Number of Imported Automobiles in China (1950-2012) (10,000 Units)
Source: Compiled based on China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2010) and China Asso-
ciation of Automobile Manufacturers/CAAM
Figure 3: Ownership of Private Vehicles (10,000 Units) from 1985 to 2013
Source: Compiled based on National Data (National Bureau of Statistics of China)
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is less than or equal to three-litres, or 110 
per cent where the size of the engine is 
bigger than three-litres and to 25 per cent 
by July 1, 2006 (Tianjin Economic-Tech-
nological Development Area Automotive 
Industry Development Research Report). 
These significantly decreased tariffs, as 
well as deregulation of non-tariff barriers 
(such as easing restrictions on car-import 
permits), made China’s entry into the WTO 
in 2001 the major new thrust in the devel-
opment of the Chinese car industry. 
In the meantime, in the face of the accel-
erated pace of globalization, China made 
significant economic progress from 2001 
onwards. Its real per-capita Gross Domes-
tic Products (GDP) stayed on an annual 8 
per cent high-growth trajectory, whilst the 
American economy went into a downturn 
(see Figure 4). Personal income, which 
is recognized as the principal economic 
stimulus to vehicle ownership (Dargay et 
al., 2007), remained for the most part in 
double-digit2 annual growth, along with 
national economic development during the 
same period. 
Furthermore, Chinese urbanization has 
been experiencing a continuous increase 
from 39.1% in 2002, up to 51.3% in 2011, 
with an average annual growth rate of 
1.35% (China National Human Develop-
ment Report 2013). This means that near-
ly 188 million rural dwellers have relocated 
to urban areas in China over that 9-year 
period. Shenzhen is a clear example, 
growing from 314,100 residents in 1979 
2 Personal income growth was actually 8.8% in 
2009.
to over 10 million in 2010 (Shenzhen Sta-
tistical Yearbook 2013). The National Ur-
ban System Planning (2010-2020) (Draft) 
selected Shenzhen, which was basically a 
fishing village, as the central city of south-
ern China since 2010. This unprecedented 
demographic leap forward on such a huge 
scale in China has caused people to gradu-
ally move away from the central cities to 
suburban areas to avoid daunting housing 
prices and other serious urban problems. 
However, the central districts of Chinese 
cities have continued to serve as the sites 
for the main political, economic and rec-
reational functions, due to the deficiency 
of ancillary facilities in peripheral regions 
(Song, 2013). The resulting commuting 
times rise rapidly with such mono-centric 
urban forms and expanding urban sprawl, 
albeit at considerably higher densities 
than in other sprawling cities such as At-
lanta, Houston or Sydney (Newman and 
Kenworthy, 1999). This phenomenon, to-
gether with an element of the car being 
a symbol of social status, meant that the 
ownership of private vehicles in China ac-
celerated dramatically in the 2000s (Gan, 
2003).
The rising purchasing power and increas-
ing distances of daily commuting trips 
have generated huge demand for motor-
ised travel, especially individual motor-
ised transport. Cars owned by private in-
dividuals are reported to outweigh those 
by public authorities, accounting for 74.4 
per cent of the Chinese market in the year 
2006 (Statistical Bulletin on National Eco-
Figure 4: Trend of GDP Growth Rate between China and USA (2001-2010)
Source: Compiled based on World Bank and Bureau of Economics Analysis (BEA)
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in force since 1978 to introduce foreign 
investment and technology. In practice, 
however, China has become essentially 
one big assembly plant for the global gi-
ant carmakers. The AIP (1994) has pro-
hibited imported technology through the 
Semi-Knocked Down (SKD) or Complete-
ly Knocked Down (CKD) approach to car 
manufacture, to protect the import substi-
tution rate. But all requirements relating to 
the legal and institutionalised protection of 
China’s car industry should be cancelled, 
as required by the WTO. External factors, 
including government intervention are 
still overemphasised in China compared 
to pure market mechanisms or the man-
agement of the enterprise itself. This has 
stifled the innovation ability of Chinese car 
manufacturing enterprises (MOC, 2004). 
To better confront the realities of the global 
environment with respect to cars, featur-
ing a well-developed competition system 
and powerful multinational automakers, 
China adopted the integration of imported 
technology with independent innovation to 
avoid “Technology Hallowing-out” and to 
establish its national brand. 
The Swedish auto company Volvo was 
ranked 232 of “The World’s 500 Most In-
fluential Brands”, compiled by the World 
Brand Lab in 2006 based on its advan-
tageous Share of Market, Brand Loyalty 
and Global Leadership. However, in the 
GFC of 2008 its auto sales fell by 18.3% 
to 374,297 Units worldwide compared to 
2007. In 2010 the Chinese-owned Geely 
Automobile Holding company saw the 
opportunity for a takeover and made an 
agreement with the Ford Motor Company 
on acquisition of 100% stakes in Volvo and 
related assets, especially its intellectual 
property regarding technology. The Volvo 
Car Group subsequently announced its 
2013 global sales increased by 1.4%, with 
a 46% surge in China (Volvo Car Group, 
nomics and Social Development in 2006). 
By 2010, ownership of private vehicles 
had reached 59.39 million, with a 25 per 
cent annual growth rate, 7.7 times more 
than the 2001 level in China (see Figure 
3). China officially entered into the era 
of rapid motorization, driven by surging 
private vehicle ownership. It took thirty-
six years from 1956 to 1992 for China to 
achieve its first million in auto production. 
The pace since Chinese accession to the 
WTO has accelerated to exceed millions of 
automobiles each year since 2003 (see Ta-
ble 1). 
Both the opportunities and challenges that 
the Chinese auto-industry has faced are 
extraordinary since its entry into the WTO. 
China’s CR3 of “Big Three” auto-manufac-
turing bases3 produced 75% of the coun-
try’s cars in 2002, which reveals the high 
industrial concentration in a few sites, dic-
tated by administrative intervention. The 
urgency for China is to transform from 
‘reactive protection’ characterised by gov-
ernment interference towards ‘proactive 
protection’ featuring global competitive 
advantages. According to WTO commit-
ments, tariff protection and non-tariff bar-
riers to cars should be gradually phased 
out within a five-year transitional period 
to buffer the stress from market liberali-
zation. Fostering self-developed capac-
ity and optimizing industrial structure are 
the long-run solutions for the future of the 
Chinese automotive industry.
In light of China’s out-dated manufactur-
ing system and incomplete component en-
terprises, the “Bring in” strategy has been 
3 The state council officially sanctioned the FAW, 
SAW and Shanghai-VW as China’s three major 
car-manufacturing bases in 1987. One year later, 
three small car assemblers in Beijing, Tianjin and 
Guangzhou were approved. It is the well-known “Big 
Three and Small Three” strategy. The SAW has been 
officially renamed as Dongfeng Motor Corporation in 
1992. 
Year 1992 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005* 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Duration 
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Table 1: Year and Duration of Automobile Production Exceeding Given Amount
Source: Compiled based on China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2011)
* The actual auto production in 2005 was 5,707,688, which is less than the data shown 
in Table 1. It is rounded to 6 million in the paper for simplicity.
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Global Newsroom). Geely also trans-
formed its operation from lower level cars 
towards more upscale models by way of 
Volvo’s technology combined with Chinese 
market conditions.
The production capacity utilization of Chi-
nese car manufacturing businesses was 
72.5% in 2005. This means that there is 
potentially a structural overcapacity prob-
lem if things remain on a business-as-
usual basis (National Development and 
Reform Concession/NDRC, 2006). The 
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) enacted 
in 2001 accordingly suggested improv-
ing and updating product structure. The 
Automobile Industry Development Policy 
(2004), which listed Structural Adjust-
ment as one chapter and the special policy 
called Notice on Opinions of Automobile 
Industry Structural Adjustment approved 
in 2006, both stressed the urgency of the 
above situation. The Plan on Automobile 
Industry Restructuring and Revitalization 
(2009) implied an acceleration of China’s 
industrial restructuring in proper response 
to the 2008 GFC. Rightly or wrongly, de-
pending on the perspective one takes, 
China has thus become the ray of hope for 
the global car market.
2.4 Stationary Phase (2011 until Present 
Day)
In 2014 the global automobile industry 
stepped into its 128th year since the first 
automobile was introduced in 1886 (Ruiz, 
1985). China surpassed the U.S. as the gi-
ant of global automobile production and 
consumption in 2009 and has been the 
major contributor to global automobile in-
dustry growth since then (Market Analy-
sis Report: China’s Automotive Industry), 
even though it came into being seven dec-
ades later.
After the extraordinary growth rates of 
auto production and auto sales in 2009 
(48.3%; 45.5% respectively) and 2010 
(32.4%; 32.4% respectively), the Chi-
nese auto-industry uncommonly under-
performed in 2011 (0.8%; 2.45%) (OICA, 
2009-2011). This has ushered in a new 
‘stationary phase’ of Chinese automobile 
industry development, partly affected by 
the implemented policies including Trans-
portation Demand Management (TDM) and 
prioritising public transport development. 
This change has in turn been brought 
about by crippling levels of congestion in 
many Chinese cities, dangerous levels of 
air pollution, growing traffic fatalities and 
injuries and other serious impacts from 
the introduction of such huge numbers of 
motor vehicles into Chinese cities in such 
a short space of time (Pucher et al., 2007). 
Photo 2 shows how the public spaces of 
Chinese cities are being taken over by mo-
tor vehicles.
However, before this period, The Chinese 
government formulated three pro-auto 
policies aiming to rebound from the 2008 
GFC comprising “Purchases Duty Preferen-
tial” (Notice on Reduction in Vehicle Pur-
chase Duty for 1.6-liter or less Passenger 
Cars, 2009), “Bring Auto into Countryside” 
(Plan on Automobile Industry Restructur-
ing and Revitalization, 2009) and “Car-
Scrapping” (Implemented Measures on 
Car-Scrapping, 2009) These are summa-
rised in Table 2. The Purchase Duty Pref-
erential, which stimulated sales of cars of 
1.6 litres or less by 71% in 2009, was very 
influential in boosting the total auto sales 
in China (CAAM, 2010). However, these 
preferential policies and subsidy plans for 
auto purchases were required to terminate 
from 2011(MOF, 2011a, b, c). China be-
gan to free up in order to build a more 
resource-saving and environment-friendly 
society as per the Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015), in which the New Energy Ve-
hicle4 (NEV) is listed as one of the nation’s 
strategic emerging industries (SEI).
4 It consists of HEV (Hybrid Electric Vehicles), BEV 
(Battery Electric Vehicles, including Solar-Powered 
Autos), Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEV), Hydrogen-
Powered Vehicles and other New-Energy vehicles 
defined by the New-Energy Vehicles Manufacturing 
Enterprises and Products Access Management Rules 
from 2009. 
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use in Beijing was curtailed according to 
the number on the license plates. Another 
example is limiting the quota of new car 
registrations in Beijing in an attempt to 
curb unsustainable levels of automobile 
ownership (Song, 2013). This has since 
been further tightened by 37.5% to only 
150,000 new car registrations per year 
since 2014 (in a metropolitan population 
which will be approximately 22 million 
people by that time) (Notice on the Work 
Plan of Beijing Motor Vehicle Emission Pol-
In contrast to this short-term response to 
the GFC, deeper issues have taken over 
and have set China into a new phase of 
restrictions on private vehicles, in order to 
reduce some of the major problems afflict-
ing Chinese cities due to large numbers of 
vehicles (Photos 3 and 4). Strategies re-
stricting purchase and use of private ve-
hicles are now emerging in the megacities 
of China. For instance, the Beijing munici-
pal government initiated the rationing of 
road space since the 2008 Olympics. Car 
Policy Content Extension
Purchase Duty Preferential
The duty will be temporar-
ily levied at the half-reduced 
rate of 5% on passenger 
cars with engines of 1.6-lit-
er or less purchased from 
January 20 to December 31, 
2009.
In the end of 2009, the State 
Council approved its exten-
sion to December 31, 2010. 
The newly formulated pur-
chase duty was increased to 
7.5%.
Bringing Auto into Country-
side
A financial subsidy amount-
ing to five billion RMB will 
be granted to farmers who 
replace three-wheeled vehi-
cles or low-speed trucks with 
light-duty trucks or 1.3-liter 
or less mini-cars from March 
1 to December 31, 2009.
It was extended to the end 
of 2010.
Car-Scrapping
The subsidy will be offered 
to upgrade old or yellow-la-
bel vehicles in advance. This 
includes gasoline or diesel 
vehicles failing to meet the 
National Emission Standard. 
The compensation value 
varied from 3,000 to 6,000 
RMB and functioned from 
June 1, 2009 until May 31, 
2010.
Its validity was extended to 
December 31, 2010.
Table 2: Three Auto-Encouragement Policies Designed to Overcome the 2008 GFC
Photos 3 and 4: The dense urban fabric of Chinese cities is increasingly filling with cars, 
which is leading to programmes to limit car ownership in cities.
Source: Yuan Gao
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lution Control 2013-2017). Up until the 
end of March 2014, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guiyang, Guangzhou, Shijiazhuang, Tian-
jin and Guangzhou had already joined in 
similar efforts to restrain car ownership. 
There are two distinctive systems for new 
car registration around China: (1) an un-
paid lottery system and (2) a paid bidding 
system. For instance, Beijing distributes 
the new car registration quota for free to 
the applicants through a lottery system. 
Conversely, Shanghai has adopted the 
Singapore-style Certificate of Entitlement 
for new car purchase, which means bid-
ding at an auction for the right to buy a 
new car. Chen and Zhao (2012) and Zhao 
et al (2014) have analysed the respective 
merits of both these schemes.
Additionally, transport investment priority 
has now been transferred towards devel-
oping Urban Public Transport  (UPT) at the 
national strategy level, especially Rapid 
Mass Transit (RMT) through the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan. RMT, which includes Sub-
way/Metro and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
within cities, as well as inter-city High-
Speed Rail (HSR), is now undergoing mas-
sive growth (Newman et al, 2013). The 
case of Chinese urban rail transport is il-
lustrative of this new priority. The “met-
ro” as a mode of transport first appeared 
in 1969 in Beijing, 106 years after the 
London Underground/Tube was first con-
structed in London (Strickfaden and Dev-
lieger, 2011). Although developing urban 
rail transport was primarily embraced in 
the Tenth Five-Year Plan in China (2001-
2005), Chinese investment in urban rail 
transport mushroomed from RMB 12 bil-
lion (2001) to RMB 260 billion (2012), with 
a 32.3% compound annual growth rate 
(2012-2013 China Urban Rail Transport 
Development Report). By the end of 2013, 
there were 87 urban rail lines in service 
among nineteen Chinese cities, with a to-
tal network length of 2,539 km (2013 Sta-
tistical Length of Chinese Operating Urban 
Rail Transport). 
Rail transport is of critical importance in 
shifting trips away from cars and motorcy-
cles. As shown in the modal splits for Bei-
jing in Figure 5, the 465 km (2013) Beijing 
metro network length has had a dramatic 
effect on public transport modes. Beijing’s 
subway is nationally the second longest, 
eclipsed only by Shanghai (577 km). The 
trips by metro in Beijing surged from 1.7% 
(1986) to 16.8% (2012). On the negative 
side there was a decimation of bicycle 
trips from 63% in 1986 to 13.9% in 2012. 
This was due primarily to a political move 
away from bikes as being “backwards” 
and the concomitant destruction of bicycle 
facilities in the city to make way for cars 
(Photo 5). It also became increasingly dif-
Photo 5: Cars parked in bike lane in Bei-
jing                            Source: Yuan Gao
Figure 5: Travel Modes of Beijing Residents’ Daily Trips (%) (Excluding Walking) (1986-
2012)
Source: Compiled based on 2013 Beijing Transport Development Annual Report
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peaked in 1985. The Chinese auto indus-
try attempted to achieve production-sales 
balance and then profitability through in-
creasing its industrial concentration and 
importing foreign technology.
Being the 143rd member of the WTO has 
promoted the Chinese auto industry from 
an outlier towards a major contributor to 
the global automobile market. In contra-
distinction to mature automobile countries 
such as the USA, China’s advantage in the 
car industry is having a huge base of new 
first time car buyers, rather than just up-
dating requirements for cars. However, it 
has also suffered from the lack of inter-
nationally influential automobile products. 
Establishing and growing its car industry 
in a relatively protectionist environment, 
the Chinese auto industry has needed to 
upgrade its industrial structure and to de-
velop self-owned intellectual products. On 
the downside, the car industry in China, 
especially in the dense and space-con-
strained Chinese cities, has generated 
very significant impacts in local commu-
nities (congestion, air pollution, increased 
traffic fatalities and degraded public en-
vironments to name a few impacts). Na-
tionally and globally, the sheer size of the 
Chinese automotive industry brings many 
resource, environmental and other prob-
lems which reduce its positive economic 
aspects. This must be taken into account 
in any further efforts that China makes to 
become an automobile powerhouse of the 
world. 
There is now evidence that China is begin-
ning to see these bigger problems and is 
responding accordingly. An awareness is 
developing that it is not possible, wise nor 
even economically sensible to turn Chinese 
cities into automobile dependent cities. It 
is now possible to see the beginnings of 
a new focus on public transport and the 
regeneration of walking and cycling as im-
portant modes of urban transport. If con-
tinued, this will allow a diversity of modes, 
including cars and motorcycles, to co-exist 
better in Chinese cities. This does not spell 
any kind of “end” to automobiles in Chi-
na, but rather it heralds a new realisation 
that Chinese cities will be better function-
ing, more environmentally attractive and 
better off economically to encourage a 
healthy balance of modes, in a similar way 
that many economically, environmentally 
and socially successful cities in Europe 
ficult to travel by bike due to the long trip 
lengths for many needs as the city spread 
(Yang et al, 2014). Finally, conditions for 
buses were not ideal either in Beijing, as 
reflected in the slow-growth of regular bus 
transit (RBT), which increased only from 
26.5% to 27.2% during the same period.
3. Conclusions
China, as the largest rapidly developing 
country, accommodates 19 per cent of the 
global population (China Population Cen-
sus, 2010) and contributes 9.4 per cent 
of global GDP (World Bank, 2010). It has 
become the object of widespread interest 
around the world. Its automotive industry 
has been facing a dilemma of risk and pos-
sibility throughout the institutional reforms 
of the decades since the end of the Second 
World War, including the New China Foun-
dation in 1949, the Reform and Opening-
up Policy in 1978, Entry into the WTO in 
2002 and the New Era starting from 2011. 
This paper has documented China’s auto-
motive development history from a “Truck 
Industry” to a national pillar industry, from 
the global automobile giant of only a few 
years ago (a status which it still largely re-
tains), to the current period of restricting 
car ownership in many cities and prioritis-
ing public transport within China’s urban 
environments, especially through rapid 
development of rail transport. 
The Chinese automotive industry, which 
mainly served military and economic con-
struction needs due to strained interna-
tional relations and a distinct command 
economy at the beginning of New China, 
overweighted its automotive production 
towards freight vehicles. The constantly 
changing national policies and excessive 
technology dependence resulted in an un-
productive and uncompetitive automobile 
production system.
The 1978 open-door economic policy, 
which pushed towards the devolution to 
local economies, raised production moti-
vation but intensified regional rivalry. Fur-
thermore, permitting and encouraging the 
ownership of private vehicles along with 
enhancement of individual purchasing 
power, shifted the industrial emphasis spe-
cifically towards the manufacture of cars. 
The contradiction between ever-growing 
automobile demand and incompatibly low 
domestic automobile supply drove the 
thirst for auto imports in China, which 
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have done (e.g. Copenhagen and Zurich). 
Chinese cities have more than enough ca-
pacity to head in such directions, and in a 
relatively short space of time, especially 
since they still have comparatively dense 
urban development patterns that support 
public transport, walking and cycling (Pho-
tos 6 and 7).
Starting around 2011, we have now seen 
China quite aggressively pursuing TDM 
policies and vigorously advocating pri-
oritising UPT. There has thus been a mo-
mentous shift in the Chinese automobile 
industry policy from ‘stimulation to sus-
tainability’. The Beijing Declaration (Wang, 
1996) suggested that the primary objec-
tive of transportation systems is to realise 
the movement of freight and passengers 
rather than the movement of vehicles. 
Despite the significant achievements of 
the Chinese auto industry for the national 
economy, the liveability and sustainabil-
ity of Chinese cities cannot be realised 
if urban mobility is primarily oriented to 
private motorised travel modes (cars and 
motorcycles). An integrated and diverse 
urban transport system in China is now 
designated to satisfy the daily trip demand 
and mitigate environmental and social vul-
nerability.
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